JMC FFC Decision - Summary
The recent JMC FFC decision upholds the principles derived from Jamsek HC and Personnel Contracting, that the common law employee/contractor determination relies on an assessment of the ‘totality of relationship’ from the terms of the written contract. In particular, the Court’s decision focused primarily on control and sub-contracting/delegation under the contract between JMC and Mr. Harrison.
With respect to control, the key point of distinction from Wigney J’s decision arose in relation to how the teaching services were agreed to be performed. The primary judge had concluded that JMC controlled how the teaching services were to be provided, highlighting that the contractual terms stipulated JMC’s provision of suggested lesson plans and Mr. Harrison’s requirement to reference these in invoicing. By contrast, the Full Court concluded that the lesson plans were not prescriptive or mandated and, as such, Mr Harrison retained a high degree of autonomy regarding teaching style - that is, JMC could not dictate how he would teach the agreed content.
In relation to Mr. Harrison having to abide by where and when lectures would be provided, the Full Court found that these aspects of control should be considered in context. In this case, it was commercially necessary for JMC to ensure teaching services were provided at appropriate times and places.
With respect to sub-contracting/delegation, noting that the written contract included such a right (albeit subject to written approval of JMC), the Court opined that the primary judge had erred in concluding that the right was merely “limited or illusory”. Specifically, the Court concluded that the requirement for written approval did not amount to a sufficient limitation, so as to rob it of its legal effect.
The Court went further to comment that the requirement of consent is often regarded as an appropriate standard to ensure legitimacy of services and to protect commercial interests. Furthermore, the question of whether Mr. Harrison had ever exercised the right to subcontract/delegate was also found to be irrelevant. The Court was explicit that it is the existence of the right that is relevant.
The Court additionally found that emails between JMC and Mr. Harrison regarding subcontracting/delegating, wherein he had noted, in advance of trimester commencement, that he would not exercise the right, was simply evidence of contract performance, rather than contractual revision.
Finally, in relation to section 12(3) of the SGAA, the Court reaffirmed the principles from Jamsek FFC, in particular, the proposition that a right to sub-contract/delegate is incompatible with being ‘for’ the ‘labour’ of Mr. Harrison.